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The principle
• Reduced Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
countries (REDD or “Avoided Deforestation” - AD) : a 
mechanism proposed by PNG, Brazil and other countries
• Deforestation (tropical): 18 to 25% of CO2 emissions 
• Avoiding deforestation: would save carbon and
biodiversity
• The bottom line: financial rewards for countries reducing 
their deforestation rate, with carbon credits (Kyoto 
assets) or money equivalent (special fund to be set up)
• Major difficulties in the current negotiation process:
– How to choose and set up baselines?
– Taking into account forest degradation (by logging)?
– Included as a Kyoto instrument (fungible credits, second 
commitment period 20013-2017) or independent (special credits 
or money) ?
How to assess the (additional) 
reduction of deforestation?
• Monitoring physical deforestation is difficult, but one can 
guess difficulties will be reduced over time
• More difficult will be to reach an agreement on the 
reference against which deforestation on the committed 
period is compared to
• Most proposals suggest deriving the baseline from an 
average of past trends of deforestation
• Some others (e.g. Congo Basin countries) claim an 
“adjustment factor” allowing them to increase their future 
deforestation, but keeping a possibility to be credited 
anyway
• Some researchers would prefer “predictive” baselines 
based on anticipated rates of deforestation country by 
country
Historical reference: winners and losers
• Indonesia and Malaysia have had and still have huge 
rates of deforestation in the 80 and 90’s, but the forest 
cover tends (or will tend) now to concentrate on 
highlands: lower trend of deforestation expected for 
“mechanical” reasons
– Future reductions likely to be “non additional”
– Would it be “fair” to reward Indonesia and Malaysia with regard 
to their past policies vis-à-vis the forest in the past decades?
• Peru, Bolivia, Congo Basin countries likely to be the 
“losers” with such baseline reference: claim for adjusting 
the reference to anticipated trends of deforestation
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Can we predict 
deforestation rates?
• An alternative solution would be to 
anticipate a likely “business as 
usual” deforestation rate on a future 
period
• Chomitz et al. (2007) suggest 
modeling land-use dynamics to 
calculate the baseline scenario. 
– But they also pointed out a 
correlation between deforestation 
rate in the Amazon and beef price at 
farm gate. They also see a 
correlation with rainfalls…
• A difference needs to be made 
between (quite) predictable variables 
(e.g. population growth) and 
guesses: 
– Who can predict often speculative 
prices for major agriculture 
commodities, such as soy, oil palm, 
beef….? 
– Who can predict the evolution of 
rainfall quantities and the risk of 
forest fires in the context of growing 
climate disorders?
An overestimation of governments’ roles and 
capacities?
• Many (most of?) factors influencing 
deforestation rates are beyond the 
reach of the governments (i.e. cash 
crop commodities price changes, 
currencies rates…)
• In a complex system, it is a 
challenge measuring the impact of 
given public actions in terms of how 
many hectares are (not) deforested
– Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1999) 
have shown the uncertain effects of 
single variables (such as agricultural 
progress) on deforestation
• If deforestation slows down, how to 
disentangle the effect of public 
policies and the other factors which 
occurred independently of the 
government action?
Carbon credits or other financial 
incentives?
• From a “Kyoto-inside” perspective: fears that “AD”
scheme would generate new huge quantities of “hot air”
with a downward pressure on the price of the emission 
permits
– Recent report from CDM executive board suggests 20% of 
carbon credits are “non additional”…
• An alternative:
– “De-coupling” from Kyoto instruments: money instead of carbon 
credits through an international fund to tackle deforestation
– Targeting, in priority, the field actors instead of the Governments
– Using a range of PES to favor changes in farmers’ productive 
practices and reward genuine conservation efforts (case by case 
assessment)
– Working with the governments to remove “perverse incentives”
(inappropriate subsidies, fiscal system…) and overcome 
structural threats, such as land tenure insecurity, weakness and
corruption within the controlling institutions and the justice…
The case for an 
International 
Fund for tackling 
deforestation
• Seeing “AD” as an 
umbrella for local PES, 
not as an international 
PES…
• No more risk of « hot 
air », but the additionality 
issue remains especially 
with the lowest 
opportunity cost areas
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Suitable PES instrument:
Conservation Easements
• Conservation easements: a contract; against an annual 
payment, between the landlord (individual or
communities) and an agency to conserve given lands
• Area targets or case-by-case negotiation?
– Case by case (property level): fine tuning possible, but risks of 
diversion (moral hazard) if connivance with the agency 
– Area target: risk of non additionality for some properties but less 
moral hazard
– Leakage possible (landlords with several properties)
– Foreseeable difficulty: targets likely to be contested by “low-
deforestation” areas’ actors who will claim being granted with 
more “pessimistic” baselines (to maximize their rent expectancy)
• Equity issue: how to avoid reinforcing the unequal wealth 
and land distribution (e.g. Brazil…)?
– Latifundists with agricultural areas enough and huge forest 
reserve will capture most of the rents
Suitable PES instrument: Transferable 
Development/Deforestation Rights
• For a given area or region: “cap and trade” system of 
deforestation rights
– The law gives the maximum amount of deforestation rights which 
can be distributed (Case of Brazil: 20% maximum of 
deforestation rights on private properties in forested areas within 
the legal Amazon)
– A market can be set up, regulated by an agency. Outsiders could 
possibly buy back deforestation rights to raise their prices and
make additional deforestation costly
• Difficulties:
– Adjusting with the field situation (properties on which more than 
20% have been deforested)
– Additionality issue: the “rights sellers” might not have the 
opportunity to use their “deforestation rights” but they sell them 
anyway!
– Control and sanctions: without stringent law enforcement, the 
system will be easily diverted: landlord will sell their rights, then 
deforest! 
Suitable PES instruments and incentives 
on public forests
• Conservation concessions can be a suitable tool on 
public lands (Africa, SE Asia…): annual payment to 
governments and local stakeholders for the opportunity 
cost of not developing the land 
– The alternative baseline is often selective logging under legal 
management guidelines
– “Leakage” possible
• Room for economic evaluation of the opportunity cost at 
multiple scale levels: the larger the conservation 
concession, the more acute will be the fairness/equity 
issue
• Sustainable forest management for timber is also a good 
alternative to land conversion and deforestation: 
incentives through tax cuts for certified concessions?
Combining economic instruments and 
law enforcement
• Detecting forest infractions (by satellite) is less difficult than 
enforcing law resulting in effective sanctions…
• How to avoid designing a scheme in which “law compliers” will be at 
a disadvantage compared to violators? 
– What conditions of eligibility?
– Setting differential regimes for compliers and non-compliers?
• The minimum condition of success is strong signals of political will to 
enforce the law: do we want to pay for that? 
– With the risk to be said :  “if you don’t pay I let my forests being 
destroyed”
• The ultimate condition is (still) the collective choices and 
collective/individual behaviors: forest are converted for feeding beef, 
producing biofuels, paper pulp… we are consuming more and 
more…
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Possibility to impute
the deforestation
reduction to the
public action
Non imputable Imputable Imputable
Possibility to quantify
the net impact on
deforestation
(N.A.) Difficult /Very difficult Possible
Appendix: measurement and imputation of various factors 
influencing deforestation: a framework of analysis
